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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For more than three decades, economists have advocated the use of the
tax system as a means of transferring income to low-income families.
Studying the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) offers the opportunity to
learn how well the tax system functions in roles traditionally handled by
the welfare system. There are two features of the EITC that distinguish it
from other U.S. income transfer programs. First, the EITC budget con-
straint is unusualin particular, only taxpayers who work are eligible
for the EITC. The shape of the constraint influences who receives the
credit, what incentives recipients face, and how much the program
costs. Second, the credit is administered through the tax system rather
than through the welfare system, and is usually received as part of a
taxpayer's annual tax refund. This administrative structure has impor-
tant implications for EITC participation and compliance rates, for ad-
ministrative costs, and for the ways in which recipients perceive its
incentives. This paper discusses these features of the EITC, and presents
evidence that the EITC has increased labor force participation among
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single women with children, and has offset a significant share of recent
increases in income inequality. The limited evidence available suggests
that the labor supply impact of the phaseout of the credit is minimal.
Rates of noncompliance are falling, and are now similar to the overall
rate of noncompliance for the individual income tax.
1. INTRODUCTION
The United States has entered a period in which large changes in income
transfer policies are likely to occur. As responsibility for the welfare
system devolves from the federal government to the states, policymak-
ers wifi have the opportunity to re-examine fundamental issues about
the design of programs that assist low-income families.
For more than three decades, economists have advocated the use of
the tax system as a means of transferring income to low-income families.
Friedman (1962) and Tobin (1968) argued that replacing the welfare sys-
tem with a negative income tax would provide greater incentives for
work because the marginal tax rates they proposed were lower than the
benefit reduction rate of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC). In addition, they argued that the tax system was an administra-
tively more efficient method of transferring income than the welfare
system. Studying the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) offers the oppor-
tt.mity to learn how well the tax system functions in roles traditionally
handled by the welfare system.
There are two features of the EITC that distinguish it from other U.S. in-
come transfer programs. First, the EITC budget constraint is unusualin
particular, only taxpayers who work are eligible for the EITC. The shape
of the constraint influences who receives the credit, what incentives recipi-
ents face, and how much the program costs. Second, the credit is adminis-
tered through the tax system rather than through the welfare system, and
usually is received as part of a taxpayer's annual tax refund. This adminis-
trative structure has important implications for EITC participation and
compliance rates, for administrative costs, and for ways in which recipi-
ents perceive its incentives. Examining these two features of the EITC
clarifies the trade-offs that must be made in designing transfer programs.
In recent years, the EITC has been offered as a policy solution to many
of the most pressing economic problems facing the U.S., and the credit
has grown rapidly. In tax year 1997, 18.1 million tax filers are expected to
receive the EITC, at a total cost to the federal government of $26.0 billion.1
1In comparison, federal spending on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (recently
replaced by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) is forecast to be $13.6 billion, and
states are expected to spend $11.6 billion on AFDC (Committee on Ways and Means, 1996).Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit85
After briefly describing the EITC, I begin this paper by evaluating the
contribution that the EITC has made to reducing poverty among families
with children and to offsetting the 20-year trend of rising income inequal-
ity. Next, I discuss the impact of the EITC budget constraint on labor
supply. I focus on whether the EITC causes taxpayers to choose work over
welfare and on whether the high marginal tax rates in the phaseout region
of the credit reduce labor supply. Then, I analyze the effect on takeup and
compliance rates and on administrative costs of using the tax system
rather than the welfare system to transfer income. I conclude by discuss-
ing the broader lessons that the EITC experience offers for the design of
transfer programs.
2. AN ALTERNATIVE TO NIXON'S FAMILY
ASSISTANCE PLAN
The Earned Income Tax Credit originated in the debate over President
Nixon's Family Assistance Plan (FAP). However, the EITC is not a de-
scendent of this plan. Rather, the EITC descends from Senator Russell
Long's work bonus plan, which was instrumental in preventing passage
of the FAP negative income tax.2
In 1972, the third year of debate over the FAP, the Senate Finance
Committee, chaired by Senator Long, sent a welfare bifi to the Senate floor
that included a wage bonus equal to 10 percent of wages.3 Long was a
leading opponent of the FAP, arguing that a guaranteed income scheme
would encourage indolence and increase the welfare rolls. His alternative
was to require welfare recipients with school-agechildren to work (at a
government-provided job if necessary) and to provide a wage bonus to
low-wage workers in order to offset the burden of the social security
payroll tax. With senators divided among the Nixon FAP, the Long
workfare and wage subsidy proposal, and an alternative minimum-
income plan championed by Senator Ribicoff, the 92nd Congress ad-
journed without passing a welfare reform bill.4 Three years later, Long
2The discussion that follows is based on accounts in the Congressional Record, Congres-
sional hearing reports, Congressional Quarterly, and the New York Times, and in Mann
(1992), Burke and Burke (1974), Lenkowsky (1986), and Moynihan (1973).
The proposed bonus applied to the first $4000 of wages and was to be phased out
between $4,000 and $5,600. Only taxpayers with children were to be eligible for the bonus.
' The 92th Congress did establish the Supplemental Security Income program, providing
federal means-tested income assistance for the aged, blind, and disabled. In addition, the
92nd Congress increased social security taxes and benefits.86Liebman
finally managed to attach his wage bonus plan, renamed the Earned
Income Tax Credit, to a tax bifi that was destined to be enacted.
When the EITC was introduced in 1975, it was for reasons having little
to do with welfare reform, and some of its most distinctive features arose
as last-minute compromises in a tax bifi of which the EITC was a minor
part. In January 1975, the U.S. economy was in a recession. The unem-
ployment rate was at its highest level since World War II. On the after-
noon of January 13, the House Democratic Study Group released a
vaguely worded report calling for large tax cuts to stimulate the econ-
omy. Unwilling to wait two days until his State of the Union address to
lay out his own proposal, President Ford went on national television on
the evening of January 13 to propose economic stimulus in the form of a
$12 billion (1975 dollars) rebate of 1974 taxes and a $16.5 billion reduction
in individual income taxes for 1975. Since the tax rebates favored those
with higher incomes, Ford also proposed a payment of $80 to each low-
income adult, phased out at a 16-percent rate on incomes above $2,250.
All adults, including those without income and those without children,
were to be eligible for the payment.
As Congress raced to enact a stimulus bill, Senator Long's wage sub-
sidy was substituted for President Ford's $80 payment and implemented
as a refundable credit based on taxpayers' earnings. The House version
was a 5-percent credit on the first $4,000 of earnings, phased out over
the next $4,000 of earnings (a maximum credit of $200). Taxpayers with
and without children were to be eligible for the credit. The Senate ver-
sion was a 10-percent credit over the same income ranges (a maximum
credit of $400). However, only taxpayers with children were eligible, so
the Senate plan was less costly than the House plan. In late March, on
the last day of the conference committee meetings, the Senate version
was adopted, giving the EITC one of its most important featuresits
focus on families with children.6
The cost of the EITC represented only 7 percent of the $21 billion
stimulus bifi signed by President Ford in 1975. Nonetheless, news ac-
counts throughout the three month period that the tax bifi was being
discussed consistently noted that with the EITC, the U.S. was taking a
historic step by adopting a negative income tax.
The EITC continued as a minor program until the mid-1980s. Small
expansions of the credit in 1979 and 1985 were insufficient for the credit
The plan also included tax increases on petroleum to encourage conservation.
6Senator Long dominated the 1975 tax-bill conference committee, in part because his
House counterpart, Representative Ullman, had only recently taken over as chairman of
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FIGURE 1. Federal Cost of AFDC and the EITC, 1975-2000
Source: Committee on Ways and Means(1996).
Notes: Cost of EITC includes outlays and tax expenditures. Data for1996and after are projections.
to maintain pace with inflation. The 1979 expansion made the credit
constant at its maximum level over a range of incomes, giving the credit
its current shape. Figure 1 shows that in this period the federal cost of
the EITC (including both outlays and tax expenditures) was substantially
below federal spending on the main cash welfare program for families
with children, AFDC.
Over the past decade, three major expansions of the EITC have oc-
curred. As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the credit amounts were
increased and indexed to inflation. In the budget act of 1990 (OBRA
1990), credit amounts were increased over several years, taxpayers with
more than one child began receiving a slightly larger credit than taxpay-
ers with one child, and supplemental credits were introduced for tax-
payers with young children and for the purchase of health insurance
for uninsured children. In addition, OBRA 1990 changed the rules for
EITC eligibility, largely in response to concerns that many ineligible
taxpayers were receiving the credit and that the existing rules were
unenforceable.7
These rule changes are described in section 7 as part of the discussion of EITC compliance
problems.88Liebman
In 1993, another large expansion of the credit was enacted; it was
phased in between 1994 and 1996. This expansion increased the maxi-
mum credit for families with one child by 9 percent and increased the
maximum credit for families with two children by 69 percent.8 The larger
increase for taxpayers with two or more children was necessary to meet
President Clinton's 1992 campaign promise that no family with a full-
time worker would be poor. Childless taxpayers with incomes below
$9,500 became eligible for a small credit (up to $323), and the supplemen-
tal credits for young children and health insurance were repealed.9 Fig-
ure 1 shows that now that this last expansion has been fully phased in,
the federal cost of the EITC is substantially larger than federal spending
on AFDC. Table 1 contains EITC parameters for 1975 through 1997.
Figure 2 depicts the 1997 EITC amounts as a function of a taxpayer's
income. The credit for a family with two or more children is phased in at
a 40-percent rate over the first $9,140 of earned income, resulting in a
maximum credit of $3,656. As earnings rise from $9,140 to $11,930, the
credit remains at $3,656. Then the credit is phased out at a 21.06-percent
rate on income starting at $11,930 (the maximum of AGI and earnings
governs the phaseout), so that by $29,290, the taxpayer is no longer
eligible for the credit.
Because tax return data contain extremely limited information about
taxpayers beyond their income, researchers studying the EITC have be-
come temporary Census Bureau employees in order to use special data
sets that match census data to the tax returns of census respondents. In
Liebman (1995b), I show that 75 percent of 1990 EITC recipients worked
at least 1000 hours per year, while 60 percent worked more than 1500
hours per year. Only 16 percent had welfare income in the same year in
which they received the EITC, and 25 percent received food stamps
during the year. The share of EITC recipients working a substantial
number of hours is likely to have increased since 1990, and the share
receiving welfare is likely to have decreased, as taxpayers further up the
income distribution have become eligible for the credit. 40 percent of
EITC recipients in 1990 were Non-Hispanic White, 39 percent were Non-
Hispanic Black, and 19.5 percent were Hispanic. 41 percent did not have
a high-school degree, while 37 percent had completed high school but
had not received further schooling.
These increases are measured relative to the provisions of the 1990 EITC expansion as if
they had been fully phased in. In fact, the OBRA 1990 provisions were only partially
phased in when the 1993 act supplanted them.
The supplemental credits had low participation rates and complicated the EITC tax form
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994).Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit89
TABLE 1
Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters: 1975-1997
(a)Basic credit only. Does not include supplemental young child credit or health insurance credit.
(b)Families with one qualifying child.
(c)Families with two or more qualifying children.












1975-1978 10.0 0-4,000 400 10.0 4,000-8,000
1979-1984 10.0 0-5,000 500 12.5 6,000-10,000
1985-1986 11.0 0-5,000 550 12.22 6,500-11,000
1987 14.0 0-6,080 851 10.0 6,920-15,432
1988 14.0 0-6,240 874 10.0 9,840-18,576
1989 14.0 0-6,500 910 10.0 10,240-19,340
1990 14.0 0-6,810 953 10.0 10,730-20,264
1991(a) 16.7" 0-7,140 1,192 11.93 11,250-21,250
17.3(c) 1,235 12.36
1992(a) 17.60') 0-7,520 1,324 12.57 11,840-22,370
1,384 13.14
1993(a) 18.50') 0-7,750 1,434 13.21 12,200-23,050
19.5' 1,511 13.93
1994 26.30') 0-7,750 2,038 15.98 11,000-23,755
30.0(c) 0-8,425 2,528 17.68 11,000-25,299
765(d) 0-4,000 306 7.65 5,000-9,000
1995 34.00') 0-6,160 2,094 15.98 11,290-24,396
36.0(c) 0-8,640 3,110 20.22 11,290-26,673
7.65' 0-4,100 314 7.65 5,130-9,230
1996 34.00') 0-6,330 2,152 15.98 11,610-25,078
40.0(C) 0-8,890 3,556 21.06 11,610-28,495
7.65(d) 0-4,220 323 7.65 5,280-9,500
1997 34.00') 0-6,500 2,210 15.98 11,930-25,760
40.0(C) 0-9,140 3,656 21.06 11,930-29,290
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FIGURE 2. 1997 Earned Income Tax Credit
3. THE EITC AND CHILD POVERTY
Between 1969 and 1996 the official poverty rate among children rose
from 14.0 to 20.5 percent.1° Over this period, the poverty rate for elderly
persons fell from 25.3 to 10.8 percent, largely due to increases in the
generosity of social security. Census Bureau estimates indicate that the
EITC played a moderate role in reducing child poverty in 1996; it re-
duced the post-tax poverty rate from 22.3 to 19.1 percent. Scholz (1994)
estimates that under 1996 rules, 36 percent of EITC payments go to
reduce the poverty gap (the difference between the poverty line and
household income for families below the poverty line), while the remain-
ing 64 percent is received by taxpayers above the poverty line.11 Since 17
percent of EITC-eligible taxpayers do not receive the credit (Scholz,
1994), 35 percent of poor households have no earnings, and the EITC
raises some recipient households only part way up to the poverty level, I
estimate that the EITC offsets only 12 percent of the total poverty gap for
households with children.12
10 Jencks and Mayer (1996) argue that official poverty measures do not accurately reflect
improvements in the well-being of children that have occurred over the past 25 years.
Scholz's estimates include the childless EITC recipients.
12y estimates use the March 1993 CPS because that is the last CPS before the change in
interviewing techniques. I form tax-filing units according to the methodology described in
Eissa and Liebman (1996). Then I apply the 1996 EITC rules (deflated into 1992 dollars) and
examine the effect of the EITC on 1992 poverty rates, assuming that the EITC does notImpact of the Earned Income Tax Credit91
The relatively minor effect of the EITC on the poverty gap is a direct
result of the program's focus on the working poor. The current EITC
parameters were chosen to ensure that families with a full-time minimum-
wage worker would not be poor. However, many poorchildren are in
households that do not contain a full-time worker.
Figure 3 presents estimates of the effect of the EITC on taxpayers at
different levels of household money income. Income is expressed as a
percentage of the poverty level in order to account for variation in
household size. Figure 3 (top) shows the percentage of households
with children that receive the EITC at different percentages of the pov-
erty line.13 Only about 40 percent of these households with incomes
below 50 percent of the poverty line receive the EITC, because many of
them have no earnings and because some EITC eligible families do not
file tax returns. Roughly 80 percent of households with children and
incomes between 100 percent and 150 percent of the poverty line re-
ceive the EITC, and the percentage falls off sharply at higher incomes
(some high-income households with multiple tax-filing units contain a
tax-filing unit with income low enough to qualify for the EITC). Figure
3 (middle) displays the average amount of the EITC received by house-
holds at different percentages of the poverty line. At low income levels,
the EITC amount is similar to the shape of Figure 2; for many of these
households, earnings are the only source of income. On average,
higher-income households that receive the EITC receive amounts close
to the average value of the credit. Figure 3 (bottom) displays the distri-
bution of EITC dollars at different percentages of the poverty line. This
graph incorporates information from Figure 3 (top and bottom) as well
as on the number of households at each income level. Figure 3 (bottom)
reveals that most EITC dollars are received by households with in-
comes between 50 and 150 percent of the poverty line and that very
few dollars go to taxpayers with incomes above 200 percent of the
poverty line. For comparison, Figure 4 displays similar distributions for
the sum of AFDC and food stamps. For these two programs, participa-
tion rates, transfer amounts, and dollars spent all peak for households
cause any behavioral responses. The total dollars that I predict will be received by EITC
recipients is well below actual program spending even though some of the people whom I
predict wifi claim the credit will not claim it. This is because many ineligible taxpayers
claim the EITC. In addition, it is possible that my CPS-based simulations of tax-filing units
undercounts low-income taxpayers. [These issues are discussed further in Liebman
(1995b).]
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with no other income, and very few dollars go to households above the
poverty line.14
4. THE EITC AND INCOME INEQUALITY
Since 1976, the share of total income received by households at the
bottom of the income distribution has been falling while the share re-
ceived by those at the top has increased. For example, census estimates
show that between 1976 and 1996 the share of income received by the
lowest fifth of the population fell from 4.4 to 3.7 percent. At the same
time, the share received by the top 5 percent rose from 16.0 to 21.4
percent (Bureau of the Census 1997). The increase in inequality has been
particularly large for male earners. Levy and Murnane (1992) find that
the proportion of men earning more than $40,000 (1988 dollars) and the
proportion of men earning less than $20,000 both increased, and that
less educated men earn less today than similarly educated men earned
in the 1960s. Since the EITC targets low-income workers with children
and has expanded over the period in which income inequality has risen,
it is possible that the EITC now offsets a sizable fraction of the rise in
inequality.15
Table 2 displays the share of income accruing to each quintile of the
14 For Figure 4, I redefine census household money income by subtracting AFDC and food
stamps. This is to make it comparable to the EITC figures, which depict the effect of the
EITC on household income not including the EITC. While one could make a case for
including the EITC in household income when looking at the effect of AFDC and food
stamps (since AFDC and food stamps are included in the measure of household income
used for the EITC figures), I think it is more common to think of the EITC as a supplement
to the basic safety net than as an alternative to it. Since relatively few families receive both
the EITC and welfare in the same year, this decision about how to measure household
income is unlikely to affect the results very much.
It is theoretically possible that increases in the EITC cause employers to lower the gross
wage offered to low-wage employees. If so, then the EITC could be part of the cause of
the increased (pre-tax) earnings inequality. This consideration has led Bluestone and
Ghilarducci (1996) to argue that the EITC and the minimum wage should be raised in
tandem. However, there are three reasons to believe that the impact of the EITC on the
pre-tax income distribution has been minor. First, casual inspection of the timing of
increases in the EITC and increases in earnings inequality suggest that the timing of the
two do not coincide. Second, low-income labor markets are often made up of workers
both with and without children, and in the short term it is presumably not possible to
pay different wages to taxpayers with children. In the long term, it would be possible to
switch the composition of a firm's work force so that a higher fraction of the work force
are workers with children and the remaining workers without children are those with the
lowest reservation wages. Third, it is traditional to assume that the full incidence of
payroll taxes is on the worker. This implies that a subsidy such as the EITC raises the
worker's net-of-tax wage.Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit95
TABLE 2
Rising Income Inequality and the EITC
Distribution of annual household income, all households
1996
1976 1996 plus EITC
(1) (2) (3)













Source: Author's calculations from the 1977 and 1997 March Current Population Surveys.
Lowest fifth 4.21 3.64 3.77
Second fifth 10.41 8.95 9.09
Third fifth 17.17 15.06 15.05
Fourth fifth 24.97 23.33 23.26
Highest fifth 43.24 49.02 48.83
Lowest fifth 8.30 6.54 6.76
Second fifth 14.26 11.50 11.50
Third fifth 18.25 15.73 15.69
Fourth fifth 22.78 21.15 21.09
Highest fifth 36.41 45.09 44.96
Lowest fifth 5.48 3.91 4.37
Second fifth 12.47 9.98 10.21
Third fifth 18.13 15.92 15.85
Fourth fifth 24.25 23.15 22.97
Highest fifth 39.67 47.04 46.60
Lowest fifth 8.54 6.54 6.90
Second fifth 14.37 11.39 11.39
Third fifth 18.25 15.55 15.49
Fourth fifth 22.64 21.10 20.92
Highest fifth 36.12 45.51 45.3196Liebman
income distribution in 1976 and 1996.16 Table 2a presents the distribution
of annual household income for all households. Columns 1 and 2 show
that between 1976 and 1996 the share of aggregate income received by
the bottom 20 percent of households fell by nearly 14 percent, from 4.21
to 3.64 percent. The share received by the second quintile fell by 14
percent, the share received by the third quintile by 12 percent, and the
share received by the fourth quintile by about 7 percent. Meanwhile, the
top quintile's share of income increased by 13 percent, from 43.24 to
49.02 percent. The standard Census Bureau measure of household
money income does not include the EITC. Therefore, I predict how
much EITC each household received in 1996, and recalculate the share of
income including the EITC that was received by each quintile. Column 3
shows that the share of income received by households in the lower two
quintiles increases when EITC benefits are included, and the share re-
ceived by the top three quintiles falls.17 The EITC offsets 23 percent of
the decline in income between 1976 and 1996 for households in the
lowest fifth of the income distribution, and offsets 10 percent of the
decline for households in the second fifth.
Rising inequality in the earnings of males has been particularly pro-
nounced over the past 20 years. Table 2b examines the contribution of
the EITC to offsetting this rise in inequality for males who work full time
(at least 35 hours per week) all year (at least 50 weeks per year).18 My
calculations indicate that the EITC has offset 12.5 percent of the decline
in earnings for males in the bottom quintile. It is not surprising that the
EITC had a smaller effect on this population, since many full-time all-
16Top coding of income in the CPS hinders intertemporal comparisons of income inequal-
ity in two ways. First, changes in the total amount of income above the top-coded level
cannot be observed. Second, the level of income at which the top coding occurs has
changed over time. In these calculations, I do not impute income above the top codes. I
simply use the top-coded values. Therefore, if incomes have risen particularly rapidly at
the top of the distribution, my estimates underestimate the rise in inequality over this
period and overestimate the impact of the EITC in offsetting this rise in inequality. I have
experimented with reducing the incomes of people at the 1996 top-coded values to be equal
to the real value of the 1976 top codes. This adjustment has a very minor effect on my
results; it increases the income shares of the bottom four quintiles by about 3 percent (e.g.,
the bottom quintile's share increases from 3.64 to 3.74 percent).
17do not take account of the increased taxes higher-income taxpayers and taxpayers
without children must pay to finance the EITC.
18Most of the males who are eligible for the EITC are married, since relatively few single
males have children living with them. For married couples in which the husband works
full time, I assign all of the EITC to the male, even though his spouse may also have
earnings. Since most full-time workers have earnings in the EITC phaseout range, the
spouse's earnings will generally reduce the amount of the EITC the married couple
receives.Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit97
year males have earnings beyond the EITC maximum or do not have
children.
The third and fourth panels restrict the samples to households with
childrenthe population at which the EITC is targeted. The EITC offsets
a larger fraction of the rise in inequality in these two samples. For all
households with children, the EITC offsets 29 percent of the decline that
occurred between 1976 and 1996 in the share of income received by the
first quintile, and 9 percent of the decline for the second quintile. For
full-time male earners with children, the EITC offsets 18 percent of the
decline in income received by the first quintile.
5. THE EITC BUDGET CONSTRAINT
5.1 Labor Force Participation
In addition to determining the distribution of EITC dollars by income,
the EITC budget constraint alters the incentives faced by taxpayers in
deciding how many hours to work. The EITC is unusual in that it unam-
biguously encourages annual labor force participation among single
workers. Most welfare programs, such as AFDC, food stamps, and sup-
plemental security income, provide the maximum benefit to a family
with no earnings. The classic negative income tax works this way as
well. In contrast, the EITC gives nothing to a taxpayer without earnings.
Since it provides either a positive amount or zero to all taxpayers with
earnings, the EITC can only increase the probability that an unmarried
taxpayer wifi decide to work during the year. In particular, the EITC is
predicted to cause some welfare recipients to leave welfare and start
working.
The percentage of single women with children who work at some
point during the year has risen dramatically since the mid-1980s. The
annual labor-force participation rate among single women with children
rose from 72.7 percent in 1984 to 82.1 percent in 1996.The increase in
participation has been particularly pronounced among less-educated
women. Between 1984 and 1996, the annual participation rate of single
women with children and less than a high-school education rose from
46.8 to 58.8 percent.
The increase in labor force participation among women with children
reflects a decline in the number of people who receive welfare without
19These rates are calculated from March Current Population Surveys for widowed, di-
vorced, and never married women ages 16 to 44 who are neither disabled nor in school.
The sample extends the sample in Eissa and Liebman (1996). Meyer and Rosenbaum (1997)
was the first paper I am aware of to document the magnitude of the post-1992 increase in
labor-force participation among single women with children.98Liebman
TABLE 3
Labor Market and Welfare Participation of Single Women with
Children, 1984-1996
Percentage of single women aged 16-45 with children who:
Work and Neither work
receive no Work and Receive welfare nor receive
welfare duringreceive welfareand do not workwelfare during
Year the year during the yearduring the year the year
Source: Author's calculations from March Current Population Surveys, 1985-1997.
working. Table 3 shows that the percentage of single women with cliii-
dren who receive welfare and do no work during the year has fallen
from 20.8 percent in 1984 to 10.8 percent in 1996. The 10-percentage-
point decline in non-working welfare recipients has resulted in a 9.5-
percentage-point increase in the share of single women with children
who work for at least part of the year, and only a 0.5-percentage-point
increase in the share of single women who neither work nor receive
public assistance.
The increase in labor-market activity by single women with children is
not simply the result of general labor-market trends or strong economic
growth. Figure 5 shows that while labor force participation among single
women with children has been rising sharply, participation among sin-
gle women without children has fallen. Indeed, among low-educated
single women without children the participation rate has fallen from 78.3
to 72.3 percent since 1984.
The important question is whether the major expansions of the EITC
that occurred over this time period were responsible for the rise in labor-
force participation by single mothers. Eissa and Liebman (1996) test
whether the EITC increases annual labor force participation among single
1984 62.9 9.7 20.8 6.6
1985 61.9 11.5 20.1 6.6
1986 61.0 11.8 20.4 6.9
1987 61.6 12.2 18.9 7.3
1988 62.7 11.6 19.4 6.4
1989 65.3 10.5 17.7 6.4
1990 62.8 13.1 17.9 6.3
1991 61.4 12.6 19.4 6.6
1992 60.9 12.8 19.3 6.9
1993 61.2 14.2 18.0 6.6
1994 64.5 14.6 14.3 6.6
1995 67.2 13.3 12.4 7.1
1996 68.6 13.5 10.8 7.1Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit99
FIGURE 5. Annual Labor Force Participation Rates for Single Women
With and Without Children
Note:Sample includes women who are widowed, divorced, or never married, ages 16-45, who are not
disabled or in school.
women with children. We estimate the effect of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 (TRA86) expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit by comparing
the labor-force behavior of single women with children (who were eligible
for the credit) with the labor-force behavior of single women without
children (who were ineligible), before and after the expansion. Since other
aspects of TRA86, such as the increase in the value of dependent exemp-
tions and of the standard deduction, reinforced the effects of the EITC
expansion by increasing the return to work for single women with chil-
dren more than it did for single women without children, the total size of
this "natural experiment" was equivalent to a $1,331 (1996 dollars) in-
crease in the maximum EITC. The paper carefully controls for other fac-
tors that might have caused the trends and concludes that the TRA86
expansion increased labor-force participation among single women with
children by 2.8 percentage points, from 73.0 to 75.8 percent. This implies
that an extra 164,000 women entered the labor force.2° We estimate a
larger effect for women who are more likely to have been affected by the
20This estimate assumes that only single women with children between 16 and 44 years of
age respond to the EITC incentive [this was the population studied in Eissa and Liebman
(1996)]. Extrapolating to the entire population of single women with children would in-
crease the number to 250,000.
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EITC increase: those with less than high school education; their labor
force participation increased by 6.1 percentage points from a base of 47.9
percent. Thus, TRA86 caused approximately 10 percent of the non-
participants in each group to start working. The average of the two maxi-
mum credit amounts (for families with one and more than one child) is
now slightly more than twice as large as the TRA86 expansion. If we make
the unlikely assumption that there is a constant relationship between the
dollar value of the maximum EITC and the percentage of single women
with children who work at some point during the year, then there are
currently 405,000 taxpayers who are working because of the EITC who
would have been non-working welfare recipients in its absence (in 1996,
the average monthly number of families receiving AFDC/TANF was 4.5
million). In addition, these results imply that the EITC was responsible for
59 percent of the increase in labor force participation that occurred be-
tween 1984 and 1996.21
Because there have been two further EITC expansions since TRA86, it
would be valuable to replicate the Eissa and Liebman (1996) study for the
other expansions. Figure 6 shows that the gap in annual labor force
participation rates between single women with and without children
tracks the maximum EITC quite closely (the correlation between the two
series is .94). However, there are two reasons why the more recent EITC
expansions do not provide as clean a test of the impact of the EITC on
labor force participation as the TRA86 expansion does. First, the 1990
and 1993 expansions were phased in slowly, so that the EITC has be-
come more generous in every year since 1991. Therefore, separating the
impact of the EITC from longer-term trends is difficult. Second, many
other policies have been adopted since the late 1980s to encourage wel-
fare recipients to start working. Separating the impact of the EITC from
the impact of Medicaid expansions, welfare reforms, and concerns
among welfare recipients that time limits are imminent is very difficult.
In addition, as in the 1980s, the EITC expansion occurred as unemploy-
ment rates were falling. Thus, it is important to control for local labor-
market conditions in isolating the impact of the EITC.
Meyer and Rosenbaum (1997) carefully model state welfare policies
and labor-market conditions as well as the level of the EITC in an at-
tempt to determine the relative importance of these various factors. They
find that state welfare policies and labor-market conditions can account
for only a modest share of the relative increase in labor force participa-
22Dickert, Hauser, and Scholz (1995) estimate a joint model of labor-market and welfare
participation on a single cross section and find results that are similar in magnitude to
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FIGURE 6. The EITC and Annual Labor Force Participation Rates
Notes: Maximum EITC is in 1996 dollars. After 1990, it is the average of the maximums for taxpayers with
one child and with more than one child. Labor force participation difference is the difference between
the annual labor force participation rate of single women with children and the rate of single women
without children.
tion among single women with children, and that the timing of the
increase corresponds closely with increases in the EITC. They conclude
that the EITC is likely to be responsible for much of the increase in labor
force participation.
An important question in estimating the impact of the EITC on labor
force participation is whether is it plausible to expect EITC recipients to
respond to the contemporaneous level of the credit. Since nearly all
EITC recipients receive the credit as part of their tax refund in the year
following the year in which they do the work entitling them to the credit,
it is likely to be at least a year after an expansion before EITC recipients
become aware of and respond to an increase in the credit. Therefore, it is
unlikely that the large increase in the EITC between 1993 and 1994 can
explain the large jump in labor force participation that occurred between
the two years.
Other national trends are an alternative explanation for their finding. To build a com-
pletely credible case that the EITC is responsible for the increase in participation will require
finding a source of variation in the credit besides time. There are two promising possibilities.
The first is that recent EITC increases differentially affected taxpayers with one and more
than one child, creating a useful control group. The second is that since state wage and price







Labor supply theory suggests that the EITC wifi cause some secondary
earners in married couples to leave the labor force. There is no little
evidence on the magnitude of this effect, although the more general
labor-supply literature suggests that participation effects can be large for
married women (see Mroz, 1987, and Eissa, 1995).However, even if
the EITC were causing a large decrease in participation by secondary
earners, the decrease might not be a reason for concern. If famffies
respond to the additional income from the EITC by deciding that the
secondary earner should consume more leisure, then there is no dead-
weight loss from the reduction in participation. There is deadweight loss
only if the reduction in the net wage due to the phase out of the credit
(the substitution effect) causes the secondary earner to leave the labor
force.
This point is illustrated in Figure 7. The top diagram illustrates the case
with deadweight loss, while the bottom diagram illustrates the case with-
out deadweight loss. Consider the standard (male chauvinist) model of
labor supply in which the wife takes her husband's earnings as exoge-
nous. In the depicted example, the husband has earnings in the phaseout
region of the EITC. His income after payroll and income taxes is AO. AB is
the wife's budget constraint in the absence of the EITC. The wife is as-
sumed to earn a gross wage of $10 an hour (net of the employer portion of
the OASDHI payroll tax). Because she must pay federal and state income
taxes and the employee share of the payroll tax, for every additional hour
she works, she takes home $7.25. Therefore, the slope of AB is 7.25. In
this example, she chooses to work a positive number of hours, and her
indifference curve is tangent to the budget constraint at C.
When the EITC is introduced, the budget constraint shifts up to DB
because the EITC provides the family with additional income. If the wife
does not work at all, the family's income is now DO rather than AO. The
slope of the new budget constraint is flatter because the 21.06-percent
EITC phaseout rate reduces the wife's net-of-tax wage to $5.13.24 With
this new budget constraint, the wife might choose to stop working and
locate at point D.
Whether or not there is deadweight loss from the wife leaving the
labor force depends on whether the indifference curve at D is steeper or
flatter than the original (pre-EITC) budget constraint. In the top figure,
the indifference curve is flatter than the original budget line. In this case,
Eissa and Hoynes (1997) explore this issue using quasi-experimental and instrumental
variable strategies, and come up with inconclusive results. They conclude that a structural
model is needed to make more progress on this question.
24 J am assuming that the family has two children.'4 HOURS
'4 HouRs
FIGURE 7. Deadweight Loss from Secondary Earners Leaving the La-
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there is a deadweight loss of DE because a lump sum transfer of AE
(which is less than AD) would achieve the same level of utility as at D.
In the bottom figure, the indifference curve at D is steeper than the
original budget line. In this example, it is the initial lump-sum transfer
that the EITC provides, and not the higher marginal tax rate, that is
inducing the wife to leave the labor force. Even if the net wage were
increased to the pre-EITC level, she would not participate. Therefore,
there is no incremental deadweight loss when the EITC causes the wife
to stop working.26
5.2 The Impact of the Phaseout of the EITC on Hours of Work
While the EITC differs from other transfer programs in that it encour-
ages annual labor force participation among single parents, the EITC is
similar to other programs in that its benefits must be phased out. The
phaseout of the EITC occurs over much higher income levels and affects
a much larger percentage of its recipients than does the phaseout of U.S.
welfare programs.
Sixty-five percent of EITC recipients have incomes above $11,930, and
are therefore in the phaseout region of the credit. Phaseout-region taxpay-
ers with two children lose 21.06 cents of the EITC for every additional
dollar they earn, and taxpayers with one child lose 15.98 cents per dollar.
Since these taxpayers pay a 15.3-percent OASDHI payroll tax on earnings
and many of them are liable for federal and state income taxes, the cumula-
tive marginal tax rates faced by phaseout-rate taxpayers often exceed 50
percent. These marginal tax rates are among the highest in the current
U.S. tax system. For these taxpayers the EITC creates negative income
and substitution effects, and is predicted to reduce their hours of work.
These effects could potentially be large. Table 4 shows that for a full-
time worker with two children earning $10 per hour, eliminating the
EITC would raise the taxpayer's net of tax hourly wage by 42 percent
and reduce the taxpayer's net-of-tax income by $1,705 (11 percent).
While there is only limited evidence on this issue so far, the evidence
that does exist suggests that the phaseout of the EITC has little or no
impact on hours of work. Eissa and Liebman (1996) examined taxpayers
who were already participating in the labor force when the 1987 expan-
sion extended the EITC phaseout to additional workers. We observed no
This is the money-metric equivalent variation measure of deadweight loss. See King
(1987) and McKenzie (1983) for discussions of this concept.
Since there are other taxes besides the EITC, there will still be deadweight loss at F
relative to a no-tax world so long as the absolute value of the slope of the indifference curve
at F is less than 10 (the gross wage).TABLE 4
1996 Marginal Tax Rate for Phaseout-
Region Taxpayer with Two Children
Note: Eliminating the EITC would increase this worker's
net of tax hourly wage by 42 percent and reduce his/her
net-of-tax income by $1,705 (11 percent).
decline in hours, although our confidence intervals were such that we
cannot rule out a small one.
Additional evidence comes from examining the distribution of tax re-
turns by income. Economic theory predicts that is taxpayers respond to
the EITC phaseout, we should observe bunching of taxpayers at the begin-
ning of the EITC phaseout, and a deficit of taxpayers at the end. Figure 8
shows the distribution of tax returns by income from the IRS Statistics of
Income public use sample of 1992 tax returns. There is little if any bunch-
ing at the kink at the beginning of the EITC phaseout range, and no
evidence of the predicted deficit of taxpayers at the EITC breakeven point.
Finally, there is qualitative evidence that taxpayers do not perceive
and respond to the incentives created by the EITC in a way that is similar
to how they respond to other tax incentives. Nearly all EITC recipients
receive the credit in a single payment as part of their annual tax refund
check in the year following the year in which they earned the income
entitling them to the credit.27 In contrast, most other features of the tax
In 1993, the most recent year for which data are available, less than 0.3 percent of EITC
recipients took advantage of the early payment option and received the credit throughout
the year in their paychecks. Thus most EITC recipients essentially make an interest-free
loan to the government. While it is possible that taxpayers are unaware of the early-
payment option or decide that the cost of filling out the form requesting early payment
exceeds the benefit, interviews I have conducted with low-income taxpayers suggest that
many value the forced savings that occurs with the EITC. In particular, respondentstold
me that they used the refunds to pay off credit card debts, purchaseappliances, and take
vacations. [See chapter 7 of Liebman (1996) for details.]
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Marginal revenue product $10.77
Firm pays:
OASDHI Payroll Tax 0.765
Gross hourly pay 10.00
Employee pays:
Federal income tax 1.50
State income tax 0.60
OASDHI payroll tax 0.765
Take-home pay 7.14
Lost EITC in phaseout region 2.106
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FIGURE 8. 1992 Distribution of Tax Returns for Taxpayers with Children
system affecting low-income taxpayers, such as the federal income tax
and the OASDHI payroll tax, are withheld from each paycheck, and
welfare benefits are received monthly. It is therefore possible that taxpay-
ers perceive the incentives from the EITC, particularly the marginal tax
rates from the phaseout of the credit, differently from how they perceive
other incentives in the tax and welfare systems.
If taxpayers know about the EITC, can understand tax rules, and can
calculate their expected adjusted gross income and earned income, then
they can determine how the EITC affects their budget constraints. In that
case, the form of the EITC payment does not matter. However, evidence
from interviews with potential and actual EITC recipients suggests that
even many past recipients have not heard of the EITC (54 percent of
EITC recipients use a tax preparer) and that those who have heard of it
generally have no idea how it is related to their earnings.28
Interviews Nada Eissa and I conducted during August 1993 in Cambridge, Massachu-
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Taxpayers and potential taxpayers who do not know about or do not
understand the EITC could still respond to its incentives. Taxpayers on
the margin between working and not working might try working for one
year and discover that they were $3,600 better off than they expected,
and therefore decide to stay in the labor force. Even if they had no idea
where the large tax refund came from, the taxpayers could realize that it
is associated with working. Furthermore, non-working neighbors of the
working taxpayer might realize that the working taxpayer was better off
than they were, and decide to start working.
It is harder for taxpayers who are unaware of the EITC to perceive the
marginal incentives from the phaseout of the credit. In theory, a tax-
payer could work half-time one year with earnings in the constant
region of the credit and full-time the following year (thereby losing
some of the EITC), and realize that the benefit from moving from part-
time to full-time work was not worth the lost leisure. This requires the
taxpayer to receive the EITC twice before adjusting behavior in the third
year. If the taxpayer's wage or family structure changed over the three
years, it stifi might be impossible for the taxpayer to determine the net
return to working additional hours. In 1988, only 38 percent of EITC
recipients had ified tax returns claiming the EITC in the previous two
years. 33 percent of EITC recipients were receiving it for the first time in
that year. Therefore, the majority of EITC recipients in that year had not
had the opportunity to learn about its marginal incentives from previ-
ous experience with the credit.29 It is important to emphasize that this
lack of opportunity to learn about EITC incentives stands in sharp con-
trast to the frequent opportunities to learn about incentives in the wel-
fare system and in the parts of the income-tax system that affect regular
paychecks. Taxpayers who increase the number of hours they work can
see, as often as weekly, the change in their take-home pay from the
increase in their labor. Similarly, a taxpayer who receives Section 8
housing assistance and who switches from part-time to full-time work
for details]. My experience filling out tax returns as an IRS VITA volunteer in March and
April 1994 revealed that even past recipients were often unaware of the credit. More
extensive interviews conducted in Chicago and described in Olson and Davis (1994) simi-
larly found low awareness and understanding of the credit. While it is possible that recent
publicity and outreach efforts (as well as the increased size of the credit) have increased
awareness, interviews I conducted in 1996 with housing-project residents and recipients of
Section 8 housing assistance show that while almost all housing-subsidy recipients under-
stand exactly the relationship between their income and their rent, the few who are
working and say that they receive the EITC have no idea whether their tax refund would
go up or down if their income increased.
Unfortunately, the IRS has stopped releasing additional years of the Michigan tax panel
data set, so there is no evidence on EITC dynamics after the recent expansions.108Liebman
wifi see exactly how much her monthly rent increases when her income
goes up.
Perhaps the most important question about labor-supply effects of the
EITC is one we know very little about: how does the EITC affect the
human capital accumulation and long-term earnings potential of its re-
cipients? Do former welfare recipients come into the labor force in low-
wage jobs and then build the skills they need to move to higher-wage
jobs? Or does the EITC phaseout tax rate trap workers at the low end of
the earnings distribution with little incentive to work harder or take risks
that would lead to higher-paying jobs?
5.3 Choosing a Phaseout Tax Rate
During the past few years, there have been Congressional proposals to
increase the EITC phaseout tax rate in order to reduce the budgeted cost
of the EITC. On a priori grounds, it is not possible to tell whether a
higher or a lower phaseout rate would be preferable to current rates.3° A
more rapid phaseout reduces the utility of EITC recipients (because for
any level of earnings they receive a smaller credit) and causes some
taxpayers to leave the labor force and return to welfare. Nonetheless,
such a policy could be desirable if it make possible a tax cut for higher-
income taxpayers that raised their economic welfare by more than the
loss for the low-income EITC recipients.31
Whether this is the case depends on the answers to three questions on
which there is little consensus. First, how much does society value a
dollar's worth of utility for EITC recipients relative to a dollar's worth of
utility for other taxpayers? Second, when using the EITC to transfer a
dollar to an EITC recipient, how much less utility does the recipient gain
than if he or she had received the dollar in a lump-sum transfer (i.e.,
how much excess burden does the phaseout of the EITC create)? Third,
what is the marginal excess burden of raising a dollar of revenue from
higher-income taxpayers and taxpayers without children?
5.4 EITC Marriage Incentives
Depending on the taxpayer's situation, the EITC can provide either a
marriage subsidy or a marriage tax. Both can be large. For example, if a
3°See Triest (1993) and Browning (1995) for differing views on whether the EITC is an
efficient method to transfer income.
31 It is theoretically ambiguous whether a faster phaseout of the credit will reduce the
program's costs. If labor supply were sufficiently elastic, the higher marginal tax rates from
the faster phaseout could result in taxpayers' receiving a larger EITC. However, simula-
tions presented in Liebman (1996) suggest that for reasonable labor-supply elasticities, a
higher phaseout tax rate does in fact reduce the cost of the EITC.Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit109
non-working single woman with two children marries a single man who
has earnings of $11,500 a year, then the EITC provides a $3,656 marriage
subsidy. On the other hand, if the woman had the earnings of $11,500
too, then the combined earnings would put the couple in the phaseout
region of the credit, and the EITC would produce a marriage tax of
$2,337. In the worst case scenario, a married couple with four children in
which each spouse earned $14,646 could divorce and each take two
children. By doing so they would gain $6,176. Clearly, this last scenario
is unlikely. Even for the more reasonable examples, there is little empiri-
cal evidence to suggest whether the marriage subsidy or the marriage tax
is likely to be more important (or whether the impact of either is likely to
be large) 32 Perhaps the most important effect of the EITC marriage tax is
to discourage some married taxpayers from revealing their true marital
status to the IRS. A recent IRS study of EITC noncompliance found that
misreporting of filing status by married couples accounted for 31 percent
of overclaimed EITC amounts (Scholz, 1997).
6. USING THE TAX SYSTEM TO TRANSFER INCOME
TO THE POOR
Experience with the EITC demonstrates that there are two main benefits
from using the tax system rather than the welfare system to transfer
income to the poor: high participation rates and low administrative
costs. However, experience with the EITC suggests that there is also a
major disadvantage to using the tax system to transfer income to the
poor: high rates of noncompliance.33
6.1 EITC Take-up Rates
Scholz (1994) has shown, using a variety of data sets and methodologies,
that between 80 and 86 percent of EITC-eligible taxpayers receive the
EITC. In comparison, Blank and Ruggles (1993) estimate that 66 percent
of AFDC-eligible families receive AFDC, and that these families receive
75 percent of the total dollars to which AFDC-eligible families are enti-
tled. The higher take-up rates for the EITC may be because there is no
stigma to claiming the EITC and because of the low costs of claiming the
32See Feenberg and Rosen (1995) and Aim and Whittington (1993) for discussions of the
marriage tax.
Additional disadvantages of using the tax system to transfer income are that it is difficult
for the U.S. tax system (based upon annual income) to respond quickly to short-term need.
In addition, the definition of income used by the tax system is likely to be worse at
identifying truly needy families than the combined asset and income eligibility test for
AFDC. Alstott (1995) contains an interesting discussion of these issues.110Liebman
credit (most EITC recipients would have filed a tax return in the absence
of the EITC). In addition, the EITC population is more highly educated
than the AFDC population and thus could be more aware of government
programs.34 There has been some concern in the literature that the high
overall take-up rates mask much lower take-up rates among the poorest
EITC recipients (Olson and Davis, 1994). However, Liebman (1996)
shows that even in the phase-in region of the credit, take-up rates aver-
age 70 percent.35 Additionally, Scholz (1994) found that highly educated
EITC-eligible taxpayers were less likely to file tax returns. He speculated
that this pattern occurred because the non-filers expected to have tax
liabilities in other years and did not want to become visible to the tax
system.
To investigate Scholz's hypothesis, I obtained tabulations from the
1988 IRS non-filer study. The IRS undertook this study in order to deter-
mine what share of persons who should have filed tax returns in 1988
did not file, and to discover what the characteristics of these non-filers
were.36 The IRS constructed a sample that was designed to be representa-
tive of all non-ffling citizens by beginning with the universe of all people
with social security numbers who did not file a 1988 tax return. Of these
potential non-filers, 41 percent could not be located, 42 percent were not
required to ifie a tax return, 11 percent had already filed a tax return, and
5 percent (representing 5 million individuals) should have filed a tax
return. Of the 5 percent who should have filed a tax return, 38 percent
were due a refund, 54 percent had tax liability, and 8 percent neither
owed money nor were due a refund.
Of the 5 percent who should have ified a tax return, the IRS obtained
tax returns from 80 percent. 7 percent of these non-filers who ultimately
filed claimed the EITC. The median amount of EITC claimed was $500,
and 75 percent of these EITC taxpayers reported self-employment in-
come. From these delinquent taxpayers, the non-filer study sometimes
collected data on their 1987 and 1989 tax returns, usually in cases in
which the auditor expected the taxpayer to have unpaid taxes from those
years as well. 92 percent of the non-filers who claimed the EITC were
due a tax refund because the amount of the EITC exceeded the tax-
On the other hand, geographic concentration of poverty may impiy that individuals
with low levels of education have more access to information about welfare programs than
low-income workers have about the EITC.
At incomes below $2,000, my estimated takeup rates fail sharply. However, the individu-
als failing to claim the EITC at very low levels of the EITC are eligible for only small
amounts of the credit.
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payer's tax liability (net of withholding). Of these EITC taxpayers with
refunds due in 1988 and from whom the auditors obtained data from
additional years, 80 percent were due a refund in 1987, and 65 percent
were due a refund in 1989. These results suggest that for many of these
taxpayers, ignorance of the EITC is a better explanation for why they did
not ifie than is an effort to avoid tax liability in other years. However,
because the IRS did not locate 41 percent of non-filers, did not obtain
returns from 20 percent of those non-filers who should have filed, and
obtained 1989 and 1987 tax returns for only about 15 percent of delin-
quent taxpayers who claimed the EITC in 1988, these results clearly are
not representative of all non-filers.
6.2 Administrative Costs
Using the tax system rather than the welfare system to transfer income
has the potential to greatly reduce administrative costs. The administra-
tive costs of AFDC in 1995 were 16 percent of benefits paid (Committee
on Ways and Means, 1996), in large part because of the need to pay for
caseworkers. By relying on taxpayers to self-report their eligibility on
their tax returns, the EITC avoids this cost.
While there is no ideal estimate of EITC administrative costs, it is clear
that these costs are much lower than administrative costs in the welfare
system. The U.S. General Accounting Office (1995) has estimated that
the administrative costs of the EITC are less than 1 percent of dollars
transferred.37 Recent IRS efforts to combat EITC noncompliance have
probably raised these costs. However, as Scholz (1997) has pointed out,
the entire IRS budget in 1995 was only $7.6 billion. Even under the
unlikely assumption that 10 percent of IRS costs were due to the EITC,
EITC administrative costs would be only 3 percent of benefits paid.
Neither the AFDC administrative-cost estimate nor the GAO estimate
includes the cost to recipients of applying for benefits, keeping records,
meeting with caseworkers, and filing tax returns. Slemrod and Sorum
(1984) estimated that in 1984 U.S. taxpayers spent two billion hours filing
tax returns and paid $3 billion for professional tax assistance. However,
including these additional costs would make the EITC look even more
efficient relative to the welfare system. Even if there were no EITC,
nearly all EITC recipients would still have reason to file a return (Scholz,
1997). Thus the cost of receiving the EITC is only the additional time
necessary for the taxpayer or paid preparer to fill out schedule ETC. For
This estimate is not based upon a detailed analysis of the marginal cost of administering
the EITC. Rather, it appears to come from applying the average cost of processing a tax
return to EITC returns and adding in the costs of all refund fraud detection.112Liebman
most AFDC recipients, the cost of repeated visits to the welfare office
and of assembling documents such as school attendance records and
letters from employers is likely to be much greater than the marginal cost
to a taxpayer of applying for the EITC.
7. THE EITC COMPLIANCE PROBLEM
Experience with the EITC suggests that there is a major disadvantage
from using the tax system to transfer income to the poor: high rates of
non-compliance. Tabulations from the IRS's Taxpayer Compliance Mea-
surement Program (TCMP), first presented by Holtzblatt (1991) and
Scholz (1990), indicate that one-third of 1985 and 1988 recipients were
ineligible for the credit, primarily because they did not have children
entitling them to claim the credit. In comparison, AFDC quality-control
data indicate that 4 percent of 1991 AFDC recipients were ineligible to
receive benefits (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1994).
Since 1988, there have been changes to EITC eligibility rules designed
to reduce noncompliance, and the IRS has adopted a series of measures
to try to reduce erroneous EITC payments. However, the maximum
EITC has more than doubled in real terms, increasing the return to
fraud. In addition, the technology of tax ffling has changed, with the
percentage of EITC taxpayers ffling electronically increasing from less
than 1 percent in 1988 to 26 percent in 1994. The IRS recently released
some results from a study of taxpayers who claimed the EITC in tax year
1994 (Internal Revenue Service, 1997). The study found that 26 percent
of EITC dollars were overclaimed, down from 35 percent in 1988.
These basic results raise three important questions. First, who are the
ineligible EITC recipients? If the ineligible taxpayers are low-income tax-
payers with children, and therefore similar to eligible taxpayers, then
society may be more willing to tolerate high noncompliance rates. Sec-
ond, are the ineligible taxpayers making inadvertent errors or are they
38It is unclear how to reconcile the quality-control data with the work of Edin (1993), who
finds that essentially all AFDC recipients have unreported income (although not necessar-
ily enough to make them ineligible for the program). Most likely, the quality-control
auditors fail to discover much of the unreported income. A recent paper by Hill, Hotz,
Mullin, and Scholz (1997) matches administrative welfare and earnings data for four Cali-
fornia counties, and finds that at least 14 percent of AFDC recipients underreport earnings
to the welfare system.
The IRS estimates that if the additional EITC compliance efforts implemented since 1994
had been in place, the overpayment rate would have been 21 percent. If correct, this
estimate would imply that the EITC non-compliance rate is approaching the overall
individual-income-tax noncompliance rate of 17 percent [see Internal Revenue Service
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deliberately committing fraud? Even is the ineligible taxpayers are
mostly low-income families with children, society might want to assign a
low or even negative social welfare weight to dollars transferred to the
noncompliant taxpayers if they are committing fraud. Third, how much
of an effect have IRS efforts to reduce EITC noncompliance had on non-
compliance rates, and what is the prospect for further reducing EITC
overpayments?
7.1 Who Are the Ineligible EITC Recipients?
In 1988, 86 percent of the ineligible taxpayers had incomes low enough
to quality for the EITC if they had been otherwise eligible. Most were
ineligible because they did not have a child entitling them to claim the
credit.
Under pre-1991 rules, a child qualified a taxpayer for the EITC if the
child lived with the taxpayer for more than half of the year and if the
taxpayer provided at least half the cost of supporting the child. There-
fore, a non-custodial parent was not eligible to claim the EITC, and a
taxpayer would be ineligible for the EITC if the taxpayer claimed a rela-
tive or neighbor who did not live with the taxpayer or if the taxpayer
invented a fictitious child. In addition, even a low-income taxpayer with
one or more children could have been ineligiblefor the EITC if the
taxpayer did not meet the support test. The support test implied, for
example, that a taxpayer who received $4,000 in AFDC benefits and
$3,000 in earnings would not have been eligible to receive the EITC.
Largely in response to complaints that the support test was difficult to
enforce, OBRA 1990 eliminated the support test as an eligibifity require-
ment for the EITC.4° By defining previously ineligible taxpayers as eligi-
ble for the EITC, this reform had the potential to reduce the EITC non-
compliance rate. It is impossible to determine from the TCMP data file
how many of the 1988 EITC returns that were disallowed failed the
support test, but would otherwise have been eligible for the EITC. How-
ever, U.S. General Accounting Office (1993)examined a small sample of
audit sheets from the 1988 TCMP. The results of this study imply that
removing the support test reduced the EITC overpayment rate from 35
percent to 21 percent.41
40 Since tax returns do not include information on non-taxable sources of support, there was
no way for the IRS to tell from a taxpayer's return whether or not the taxpayer metthe test.
41 The GAO sample represents only 4 million of the 6.21 million tax returns with disal-
lowed dependent exemptions. The sample does not represent the entire tax-filing popula-
tion, because some audit sheets could not be found, and because discrepancies were found
between some of the audit sheets and the TCMP computer file. Therefore, the results of
the GAO sample could be biased.114Liebman
In order to learn more about the characteristics of ineligible EITC recipi-
ents, I became a special sworn Census Bureau employee and used a data
set which matched the March 1991 Current Population Survey to the tax
returns of CPS respondents [see Liebman (1995b) for the full details].42 I
estimated the percentage of 1990 EITC recipients who told the CPS inter-
viewer that there were no children living in their household.
I found that between 10 and 21 percent of all EITC recipients lacked
children qualifying them for the EITC. Male taxpayers ffling as house-
hold heads were particularly likely to be ineligiblebetween 25 and 53
percent lacked children, depending on the exact measure of eligibility
used.43 In addition to providing an alternative measure of dependent-
child-related EITC noncompliance, my work with the CPS-IRS match
demonstrated that in 1990, 87 percent of EITC recipients had children
living in their households at the time that they received the EITC.
While the IRS has not released sufficient information from the 1994
EITC compliance study to make it possible to fully characterize current
ineligible EITC recipients, recent Congressional testimony by a Treasury
Department official indicates that improper claiming of children contin-
ues to be the largest source of erroneous EITC claims (Scholz, 1997). In
particular, 39 percent of overclaimed EITC amounts are due to taxpayers
claiming children who did not reside with them for over half of the year.
7.2 Taxpayer Error or Taxpayer Fraud?
Most ineligible EITC recipients have low incomes, and many children
residing in their households. If the ineligible taxpayers are making inad-
vertent errors in claiming the EITC, then society may still attach a high
value to the dollars that are transferred to them. On the other hand, if
the ineligible taxpayers are fraudulently evading taxes, then society
might want to assign a low or even negative value to the dollars trans-
ferred to these ineligible taxpayers.
Liebman (1995a) estimates the share of EITC noncompliance that is
due to inadvertent error and the share that is due to tax evasion. The
basic insight motivating the estimation is that the amount of inadvertent
In order to protect census respondents, U.S. law does not permit the Census Bureau to
share with the IRS micro data in which individuals can be identified. Therefore, research
matching census micro data with tax-return data can only be done by Census Bureau
personnel.
4 The lower estimates come from defining taxpayers as ineligible only if therewere no
children in both their March 1990 and March 1991 CPS households. The higher estimates
come from defining taxpayers as ineligible if there were no children fri their 1991 CPS
household or if the total number of dependents claimed on tax returns filed by household
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error should not respond to the size of the tax credit available to a
taxpayer who claims the EITC. In contrast, tax evasion should increase
when the return to such behavior grows. My data for this study were
1985 and 1988 cross sections from the IRS's Taxpayer Compliance Mea-
surement Program. In these data, I can observe the number of children
that each taxpayer claimed on his or her tax return and the number of
children that the auditor determined the taxpayer was entitled to claim. I
test whether the probability that a childless taxpayer claims a child on his
or her tax return depends on the reduction in tax liability from making
such a claim. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) increased the
return to claiming children by different amounts at different levels of
income, I am able to separate the effect of the EITC from any underlying
relationship between income and compliance behavior that happens to
be correlated with the EITC in the cross section.
I find that the EITC is positively correlated with the probability of non-
compliance and estimate that the TRA86 expansion of the EITC caused
between 246,000 and 369,000 additional ineligible taxpayers to claim the
EITC. My results imply that of every additional dollar spent on the EITC,
24 cents go to ineligible taxpayersil cents to taxpayers who are re-
sponding to the EITC incentive to wrongly claim children (and therefore
potentially committing fraud), and 13 cents to taxpayers who would
wrongly claim children even in the absence of the EITC (some of these
taxpayers may be deliberately overclaiming children in order to benefit
from personal exemptions and the head-of-household ffling status).
7.3 Is Noncompliance Declining?
During the 1990s, the IRS has taken a number of important steps to
reduce EITC noncompliance. For example, before sending out tax re-
funds, the IRS now verifies the social security numbers of children
claimed on tax returns.In addition, the IRS has introduced sophisti-
cated new computer algorithms for spotting unusual patterns of EITC
filings. I presented results above that suggest that elimination of the
support test should by itself have reduced noncompliance rates to levels
similar to those reported in the 1994 EITC noncompliance study. There-
fore, it is worth asking whether these more recent compliance efforts
have had any effect.
While it is impossible to be certain, it seems likely that the reforms
have had a substantial impact. The results of my study of the non-
compliance response to the 1987 expansion of the EITC indicate that a
Because it is rarely cost-effective to pursue a low-income taxpayer after a tax refund has
been mailed, it is important to determine eligibility before sending out the refund check.116Liebman
45-percent increase in the maximum EITC increased the noncompliance
rate by 14 percent. It is highly speculative to extrapolate from these
results to more recent EITC expansions. In particular, the nature of EITC
noncompliance has changed with the elimination of the support test and
the expansion of the EITC to higher-income taxpayers, and extrapola-
tions from reduced-form regressions can be misleading. Nonetheless,
between 1990 and 1994 the value of the EITC slightly more than doubled,
so we might have predicted an increase in noncompliance of 33 percent
from the 21-percent post-support test level to 28 percent. Thus if recent
reforms have reduced the rate of noncompliance to 21 percent, then they
have eliminated one-quarter of EITC non-compliance.
At the Treasury Department's request, Congress recently passed six
new reforms that are likely to further reduce EITC noncompliance. In
addition, Congress provided the IRS with additional funding to expand
EITC compliance efforts. Among these reforms are two provisions that
will enable the IRS to better identify erroneous EITC claims during pro-
cessing. One reform wifi allow the IRS to use information from the
national registry of child-support awards that is being constructed as
part of welfare reform. These data will help the IRS spot cases in which
non-custodial parents are claiming their children even though the chil-
dren do not live with them. A second reform is that the Social Security
Administration wifi soon begin recording the identities of parents when
they issue a social security number for a child. Using these data, the IRS
wifi be able to identify taxpayers who claim children who are not their
own.
8. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DESIGN OF
TRANSFER PROGRAMS
This study of the Earned Income Tax Credit has highlighted a series of
fundamental trade-offs that need to be faced in designing transfer pro-
grams. The first set of trade-offs involves the choice of a budget con-
straint. The EITC is an inefficient way to combat poverty in that it
transfers the majority of its dollars to taxpayers at or above the poverty
level. In contrast, programs which use the standard welfare budget
constraint transfer most of their dollars to households with little other
income. However, the families that receive the EITC receive few other
transfers and usually include individuals who work a large number of
hours at low wages. If society wants to reward work, especially in light
of widening earnings inequality, the EITC appears to be an effective
way to target low-wage workers.Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit117
In addition to determining the distribution of dollars by income, the
choice of a budget constraint affects taxpayer behavior. Research on the
EITC demonstrates that it is possible to design a budget constraint using
the tax system that wifi encourage welfare recipients to start working.
However, since the EITC accomplishes this by increasing the return to
full-time low-wage work, it requires phasing out the credit over a fairly
thick part of the income distribution. If the moderate-income taxpayers
in the phaseout range of the credit have relatively low social-welfare-
function weights and if the phaseout tax rate causes substantial dead-
weight loss, then the benefits of the program may be outweighed by the
costs of raising the revenue that is transferred to phaseout-region recipi-
ents. These costs and benefits are heavily influenced by the choice of a
phaseout tax rate. Higher phaseout tax rates lower the utilities of EITC
recipients, bit increase the average social welfare weight of recipients
while reducing the revenue cost of the program and raising the utilities
of non-recipient taxpayers.
The second set of tradeoffs involves the choice of a system to use for
administering the chosen budget constraint. Using the tax system, it is
possible to reduce administrative costs and increase program participa-
tion rates by eliminating welfare caseworkers. However, without case-
workers it becomes difficult to verify recipient eligibility. In the case of
the EITC, we have seen that very high rates of non-compliance can occur
when recipients are permitted to self-determine eligibility status. The
tradeoffs between administrative costs and participation rates on the one
hand and compliance rates on the other occur within a given transfer
systems as well as across different systems. In the past few years, the
IRS has devoted considerable additional resources to verifying taxpayer
eligibility for the EITC and to recognizing emerging patterns of fraud.
While non-compliance rates have fallen, it is clear that the IRS actions
have raised administrative expenditures and have discouraged some
eligible taxpayers from receiving the credit.
Finally, I have presented evidence that there are important interactions
between the two sets of trade-offs. In particular, the form in which the
budget constraint is administered affects the ways in which program re-
cipients perceive and respond to it. Thus in evaluating a transfer program,
it is important to use models that are flexible enough to explore different
assumptions about how taxpayers respond to the program's incentives.
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